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I.  Introduction 
School choice aims to enhance educational quality and to create opportunities for 
students who would otherwise be deprived of a better education.  Originally introduced by 
economist Milton Friedman, this idea creates an educational market of public and charter 
schools.  Market forces will, theoretically, increase the quality of public schools because of 
competition.  As school choice becomes more and more popular, pressure is being exerted on the 
public school system to increase quality so that the best students will not leave their schools for 
private or charter institutions.  This paper will narrow the field of school choice and will examine 
the impact of charter schools on National Percentile Rankings (NPR) from standardized test 
scores of charter and public schools in the Little Rock, Arkansas area.  The study hypothesizes 
that charter attendance positively impacts test score NPRs for both elementary and middle school 
students.  It will open with a brief introduction of charter schools and the literature surrounding 
them.  Then, the data and methodology used in this study will be discussed, followed by the 
results.  Lastly, this paper will include suggestions on charter policy based on the outcome as 
well as avenues for further research.      
II. Charter Schools: An Overview  
The two main forms of school choice are voucher programs and charter schools.  
Vouchers award a specific amount of money to successful applicants to cover all or some of the 
cost of private school tuition.  When the income variable is less of a consideration for parents, 
economics tells us that they will choose to send their student to the best school, usually a private 
school.  Vouchers are considered to be the more controversial of the two forms because public 
funds are used to pay student’s tuition to private, often religious schools.  Private schools, in 
turn, also fear that this paves the way for the government to control their curriculum.  Charter 
schools, or “charters”, are “publically funded, privately operated schools that families can select 
outside of their zoned schools.  They promise greater school-level autonomy in exchange for 
greater accountability” (Loeb, Valant, Kasman, 2011).  Charters are less controversial than 
voucher programs because operate under a management contract in which the authorization 
agency may revoke the charter and close the school if at any time it doesn’t meet its 
requirements and obligations (Scholmer, Shober, Weimer, Witte, 2007).      
 There are two types of charter schools: conversion schools and startup schools.  
Conversions initially start out as public schools and usually retain existing faculty and students.  
The motivation to convert is explained by either a need to escape bureaucracy from the public 
school districts or because the school does not like its mandated curriculum.  Conversely, startup 
charter schools are entirely new schools that “acquire facilities, faculty, and students at their 
inception.”  The motivation for a startup usually derives from the need to create a new “holistic 
approach to schools”.  Because startups tend to be more radical than their conversion 
counterparts, there is a greater expected difference between startup charters and public schools 
than conversions and public schools (Buddin, Zimmer, 2005).   
III. Review of Literature 
 There is an abundance of literature on the impact of charter schools not only on student 
test scores, but also the test scores of public schools, minority student, and student behavior.  
Since test score gains are the most direct indicator of educational improvements, the majority of 
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research has been conducted using samples of public and charter schools.  A number of studies 
conclude that charter school attendance leads to some degree of positive test score gains.  Studies 
in Arizona (Nelson, Hollenbeck, 2001) and Boston (Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, 
Pathak, 2011) school districts have determined that charter attendance is positively correlated 
with an increase in test scores.  Another study conducted by renowned school choice researcher, 
Dr. John Witte, and his colleagues which looks at longitudinal data from schools in the 
Milwaukee area draws the same conclusion (Witte, Weimer, Shober, Schlomer, 2007).  
Grosskopf, Hayes, and Taylor (2009) found that Texas schools have positive gains in Math and 
Reading scores, in which they measured the “value added” to standardized test scores.  MacIver 
and Farley-Ripple declare strong support for the charter school system in Baltimore and say that 
the city’s Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) charter schools have shown high achievement 
levels that have greatly surpassed their Baltimore City Public School System (BCPSS) 
counterparts.  Lastly, Curto and Fryer (2011) found that attendance of SEED schools (a 
combination of a charter school and a five-day-a-week boarding school) increase achievement by 
0.189 standard deviations in Reading test scores and 0.230 in Math test scores per attendance 
with over an 18% return on investment.  It is also important to note that SEED schools have a 
lottery-based admissions system and are therefore less susceptible to selection bias.   
 Despite the plethora of studies which conclude that charter attendance leads to positive 
test scores gains, there have also been a significant amount of studies which have concluded just 
the opposite.  Two separate analyses of Michigan charter schools found that students do not 
reach the same level of achievement as their public school counterparts by 2-9% in Reading, 
Writing, Math, and Science standardized test scores.  In their models, the researchers controlled 
for student, building, and district characteristics.  However, they note that they did not account 
for selection bias in their study (Eberts, Hollenbeck, 2001).  Bettinger (2005) also uses school-
level data from Michigan to conclude that test scores are negatively affected.  In a paper titled 
“Explaining Charter School Effectiveness”, the authors go as far as to generalize that all non-
urban charters are ultimately ineffective because of school-level homogeneity (Angrist, Pathak, 
Walters, 2011).                                                                                                                              
Given that economists have drawn conclusions on both sides of the spectrum, declaring that 
charters lead to positive and negative test scores effects, it would be logical to assume that there 
are a number of “mixed effects” conclusions, which several do.  In the paper “Student 
Achievement in Charter Schools in San Diego”, Tang (2007) finds that charter attendance results 
in the same gains as public schools overall with the exception of elementary charter Math and 
Reading score, which drop significantly.  Another group of researchers believe that test score 
gains are possible, but only over a certain period of time.  Studies conducted in Wisconsin, New 
Jersey, and Florida have all suggested that although charter scores may start off lower than or 
equal to public scores, “performance improves as the charter schools gain experience” (Barr, 
2007).  When analyzing Florida schools, Sass (2006) supports this claim and found that 
achievement for charters improves after five years and proposes that market forces due to 
competition may lead to these gains.         
 If charter schools do in fact have a positive impact on test scores, it seems to be most 
observable in an urban setting.  Several studies suggest that urban areas are the only place which 
charters can make a significant positive impact.  The paper “Explaining Charter School 
Effectiveness” states “estimates using admissions lotteries suggest that urban charter school 
boost student achievement, while charters in other setting do not.”  Angrist, Pathak and Walters 
reach also this conclusion after studying student and school-level data from schools throughout 
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Michigan.  Zimmer and Buddin propose that this might be the case simply because of 
demographics.  Urban charters tend to serve the most “disadvantaged students” and therefore are 
more effective because of their impact on below-average achievers.   
 The objective of charter schools in not only to provide an alternative means of a quality 
education, but to service those who have less access to it.  In “Are High Quality Schools Enough 
to Increase Achievement Among the Poor?” Dobbie and Fryer use data from Harlem Children’s 
Zone, an experimental program which combines community programs and charter schools.  They 
find that achievement effects are large enough to close the racial gap in elementary, middle, and 
high schools and believe that “high quality schools are enough to significantly increase academic 
achievement among the poor”.  In another study by Fryer, he urges policy-makers to “take these 
examples to scale” so that they may have a significant positive impact on the disadvantaged 
communities throughout the country.  Just as with overall charter achievement, there are skeptics 
who believe charters actually increase the racial gap between whites and minorities.  In a 
scathing paper titled “No Excuses: A Critique of the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) 
within Charter Schools in the USA”, the author Brian Lack argues that KIPP fosters capitalistic 
and militaristic ideals that preserve the “status quo” and “institutionalized racism” (Lack).  North 
Carolina charter schools are shown to further segregate white and black students.  Bifulco and 
Ladd used time-series data to track the test scores of individual students and find that charter 
schools “increase racial isolation for both black and whites…and [widen] the achievement gap”.  
They believe this may be because of asymmetric preferences of each race to attend the charter 
school where they are the majority.  This may explain why there are so few racially balanced 
charter schools (Bifulco, Ladd).  Enrollment of minorities in charters is also the main subject of 
many other research papers.  Along the same lines as the study of North Carolina charter schools, 
data from 1,006 charter schools households in Texas find that race is a good predictor of parents 
choose to send their students to a charter school or not.  Tedin and Weiher support this argument 
and say that “Whites, African-Americans, and Latinos transfer into charters schools where there 
is a 11-14% more of that ethnic group in the student body”.  One paper pushes the segregation 
issue even further and proposes that black enrollment in charters is a function of public school 
district segregation and state policy which determines school choice legislation.  In “Choice, 
Charter Schools, and Household Preferences”, Kleitz and Bretten point out that although there 
are differences in school choice among races and socio-economic strata, they do not show a 
difference in the concern for academic excellence.         
 While most researchers of charter schools focus on more debated topics such as 
achievement gains, others concentrate on the externalities of these schools.  Impacts on the 
surrounding public schools and student behavior are the most discussed externalities.  Renowned 
economist Milton Friedman believed that the introduction of school choice will create a market 
for education and competitive pressures will force public schools to increase their quality.  
Numerous studies have shown that charter schools have a positive impact on the test scores of 
public schools in surrounding areas (Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg, Jansen).  North Carolina 
public school test scores are shown to have increased by 1% after the introduction of charters 
(Holmes, DeSimone, Rupp).  Evidence from Michigan and Arizon has also found that charters 
may lead to the same effect.  Nevertheless, other researchers have concluded that charters may 
cause public school test scores to decline because they drain resources.  In Arizona, the student-
teacher ratio increased by 6% after charters enticed teachers to work in the more flexible charter 
environment (Dee, Fu).  One paper proposes that public schools become less efficient as 
resources and taken away (Ni).  
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IV. Data and Methodology 
To determine if charter attendance has a significant impact of test score NPRs for both 
elementary and middle school students, I employ the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation 
procedure.  The intercept parameter “β1” denotes that the dependent variable “Test Score” will 
not take a value of zero if all other independent variables are controlled for.  The charter dummy 
variable is used as an intercept dummy variable where:  
Regression 1:  
E(Test Score NPR)i = (β1 + δ) + β2(%FLP)i + β3(%White)i + β4(%Black)i + β5(%Other 
Minority)i + β6(School English Language Learner) + β7(School Poverty Index) + εi, when C=1 
and,  
E(Test Score NPR)i = β1 + β2(%FLP)i + β3(%White)i + β4(%Black)i + β5(%Other 
Minority)i + β6(School English Language Learner)i + β7(School Poverty Index) + εi, when C=0. 
When C=0, it will denote that a particular school is a public school (or a “non-charter”) 
and will be the base group for the models, while a C=1 will denote that a school is a “charter” 
school.  Therefore if δ is significant, it will offer evidence that charter schools to have an impact 
on the test score NPR of a given subject.  It is important to note that the Least Squares 
Estimator’s properties are not affected by the intercept dummy variable.  Because “School 
Percent White”, “School Percent Black” and “School Percent Hispanic” and “Percent Other 
Minority” would all equal to one and “Percent Overall School Minority” would be equal to 1-
“School Percent White”, I omitted the “School Percent Hispanic” and “School Percent Overall 
Minority” variables in each of the equations to mitigate multi-collinearity.  Collinearity is where 
economic variables move together in systematic ways.  To compensate for this, any significance 
in “School Percent Hispanic” will be present in the β1 intercept variable.     
 Next, I use a more refined regression to determine if poverty significantly impacts test 
score NPRs in all subjects.  These two models throw out all race independent variables as well as 
“School English Language Learner”, only using “School Poverty Index” and “Percent Free 
Lunch Program”.  The two did not show signs of collinearity, so they are both used in the model.  
Regression 2:  
E(Test Score NPR)i = (β1 + δ) + β2(%FLP)i + β3(School Poverty Index) + εi, when C=1 
and,  
E(Test Score NPR)i = β1 + β2(%FLP)i + β3(School Poverty Index) + εi, when C=0. 
Thirdly, this study uses two other models to determine if being a minority significantly 
impacts test score NPRs in all subjects.  The use of “Overall Minority” as a collective group can 
point towards selection bias in charter schools, which will be discussed in more detail later in 
this section.   
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Regression 3:  
E(Test Score NPR)i = (β1 + δ) + β2(%Overall Minority)i + εi, when C=1 and,  
E(Test Score NPR)i = β1 + β2(%Overall Minority)i + εi, when C=0. 
 The final two models employed in this study take into account both poverty and overall 
minority variables.  Unlike the previous regressions, the charter data for both of these models are 
separated into “poor-performing charters” (Regression 4) and “well-performing charters” 
(Regression 5).  If all other independent variables are controlled for, these models determine how 
the charter variable impacts these charter categories.   
Regressions 4 and 5:  
E(Test Score NPR)i = (β1 + δ) + β2(%FLP)i + β3(%Overall Minority)i + β4(School 
Poverty Index) + εi, when C=1 and,  
E(Test Score NPR)i = β1 + β2(%FLP)i + β3(%Overall Minority)i + β4(School Poverty 
Index) + εi, when C=0. 
The school-level data used for this analysis is provided by the University of Arkansas 
Office for Educational Policy.  The data set includes all public and charter schools in the Little 
Rock, North Little Rock, and Pulaski school districts for the 2010-2011 academic year.  The “test 
score NPR” data used in the study is taken from the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) exam as a 
Norm-Reference Test for all of the schools used in the data set.  The ITBS is administered in 
conjunction with the Arkansas Criterion-Referenced Exam (CRT) to form the augmented 
benchmark examination. The ITBS contains subtests in Reading, Mathematics, Language, and 
Science.  Table 1 shows all of the variables used in this paper. 
 
Table 1: Definitions of all Variables 
Variable Description 
School Name School name 
District Name School district name 
Charter A value of “1” denotes that a school is a 
Charter and a value of “0” denotes that a 
school is a public school. 
Reading NPR School National Percentile Rank (NPR) on the 
reading subject area of the Iowa Test of Basic 
Skills (ITBS). 
Math NPR School National Percentile Rank (NPR) on the 
math subject area of the Iowa Test of Basic 
Skills (ITBS). 
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Language NPR School National Percentile Rank (NPR) on the 
language subject area of the Iowa Test of Basic 
Skills (ITBS). 
Science NPR School National Percentile Rank (NPR) on the 
science subject area of the Iowa Test of Basic 
Skills (ITBS). 
Overall NPR Overall School National Percentile Rank 
(NPR) is the average of the Normal Curve 
Equivalent for each ITBS Subtest (Reading, 
Math, Language, and Science). 
% FRL The actual percentage of students in each 
school who qualify for the Free and Reduced 
School Lunch Program. 
School Poverty Index The Poverty Index Range is a poverty indicator 
which gives a greater weight to students with 
greater need. 
% White Percent of students who identify as White. 
% Hispanic Percent of students who identify as Hispanic. 
% Black Percent of student who identify as Black. 
% Other Races Percentage of students who identify by another 
race that is not stated above. 
% Overall Minority Percent of overall minority (non-white) 
students. 
% English Language 
Learner 
Percent of students who identify as English 
Language Learner. 
 
Charter students are not a random sample of public school students.  They usually enroll 
as disproportionate amount of either low-achieving and at-risk student or more astute students 
who seek the freedom or rigorous environment of charter schools (Buddin, Zimmer, 2005).  
Therefore a difference in test score NPRs may largely be attributed to selection bias within 
charters.  This model will control for “% FLP”, “School Poverty Index”, “% White”, “Percent 
Black”, “% Other Minority, “% English Language Learner” in order to determine if the 
“Charter” variable significantly impacts test scores.  This paper hypothesizes that attendance of a 
charter significantly impacts student test score NPRs due to selection bias.  An initial comparison 
shows that charter schools have significantly different demographics, which suggests that 
selection bias is occurring.  Tables 2, 3, and 4 below are the charter’s standard deviations for 
each racial variable:  
Table 2: Elementary Charter School Standard Deviation for Race Variables 
Elementary School 
Name 
Standard 
Deviation of 
“% White” 
Standard 
Deviation of 
“% Black” 
Standard 
Deviation of “% 
Hispanic” 
Standard 
Deviation of “% 
Overall 
Minority” 
Arkansas Virtual 
Academy 
2.07 -1.92 -0.69 -2.07 
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Dreamland Academy -1.14 1.33 -0.08 1.14 
eStem Elementary 
Charter 
0.41 -0.45 -0.32 -0.41 
Lisa Academy  0.86 -0.93 -0.32 -0.86 
 
Table 3: Middle Charter School Standard Deviation for Race Variables 
Middle School Name Standard 
Deviation of 
“% White” 
Standard 
Deviation of 
“% Black” 
Standard 
Deviation of “% 
Hispanic” 
Standard 
Deviation of “% 
Overall Minority 
Arkansas Virtual 
Academy 
2.74 -2.46 -0.63 -2.74 
Cloverdale 
Aerospace 
-1.08 -0.75 1.78 1.08 
Covenant Keepers 
Charter 
-1.16 0.32 3.70 1.16 
eStem Middle 
Charter 
0.45 -0.45 -0.31 -0.45 
Lisa Academy -0.02 -1.44 0.17 0.02 
Ridgeroad Charter -0.78 0.79 0.49 0.78 
 
Table 4: Elementary and Middle Public School Standard Deviation for Race Variables 
Public 
Schools 
Standard 
Deviation of “% 
White” 
Standard 
Deviation of “% 
Black” 
Standard 
Deviation of “% 
Hispanic” 
Standard Deviation 
of “% Overall 
Minority” 
Elementary 0.26 
 
0.25 
 
0.08 
 
0.26 
 
Middle  0.20 0.20 0.03 0.20 
 
 The standard deviations for each race variable disproportionately high for both 
elementary charters and middle school charters.  The highest standard deviation for public 
elementary and middle schools are only 0.26 and 0.20, respectively.  This is in complete contrast 
to charter schools, which have standard deviations up to 2.74.  Although almost all of the 
charters have high standard deviations in all race variables, eStem Elementary and Middle 
schools have consistently low deviations.  These values, however, are not as low as the highest 
public school standard deviation.  Lisa Academy also has particularly low standard deviations for 
“% White”, ‘% Hispanic”, and “% Overall Minority”.  We can conclude then that public schools 
have consistent demographics and charter schools tend to have skewed demographics.   
 In an initial comparison of charter and non-charter mean Subtest NPRs, elementary and 
middle school charter students consistently surpass their non-charter counterparts (Figures 1 and 
2).  The exception to this trend is the mean NPR of the Language Subtest in which the non-
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charter elementary students outperformed the elementary charters by 2 percentage points, as 
shown by Figure 1.   
Figure 1: Elementary School Charter vs. Non-Charter Mean NPR Scores 
 
 
Figure 2: Middle School Charter vs. Non-Charter Mean NPR Scores 
 
The mean test score NPR between charters and non-charters above demonstrate their 
marked difference as a collective group.  Statistical analysis shows that each charter schools has 
a significantly variance from the mean, the most extreme standard deviation being -2.01 and the 
least being -0.56.  The chart below gives these values for each charter school: 
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Table 5: Elementary Charter School Test Score NPR Standard Deviation 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Middle Charter School Test Score NPR Standard Deviation 
Middle Charter School Test Score Standard Deviation 
Arkansas Virtual Academy  1.70 
Cloverdale Aerospace -1.02 
Covenant Keepers -0.69 
eStem Middle School 0.91 
Lisa Academy 1.37 
Little Rock Prep -0.69 
Ridgeroad Middle -0.56 
 
A deeper look into specific schools in the Little Rock area shed light on the magnitude of 
their selection bias.  A total of eight different charter school systems were used in this data set: 
Arkansas Virtual Academy, Cloverdale Aerospace, Covenant Keepers Schools, Dreamland 
Academy, eStem Schools, Lisa Academy, Little Rock Preparatory Academy, and Rigdewood 
Charter.  Some of these schools contained different schooling cohorts within them, such as the 
Arkansas Virtual Academy Elementary School and the Arkansas Virtual Academy Middle 
School.  This paper will look for specifically at Arkansas Virtual Academy Middle School, 
Dreamland Academy, and eStem Schools to point out selection bias in the charter school system.
 Arkansas Virtual Academy (ARVA) is a particularly unusual case because it is an online 
charter school which serves grades K-8.  The school has a first-come, first-serve policy for open 
enrollment.  When there are more applications than slots available for the year, they use a lottery 
system to determine who will be admitted.  Attendance, daily lessons, and interaction with 
teacher are all online.  ARVA stresses its flexibility because students set their own pace.  Below 
are individual statistics for Arkansas Virtual Academy Middle School: 
Table 7: Arkansas Virtual Academy Statistics 
Reading NPR 75 % FLP 0% 
Math NPR 62 School Poverty Index 0% 
Language NPR 58 % White 94% 
Science NPR 76 % Hispanic 3% 
Overall NPR 67 % Black 3% 
Overall NCE 59.2 % Overall Minority 6% 
 
Elementary Charter School Test Score NPR Standard Deviation 
Arkansas Virtual Academy 0.95 
Dreamland Academy -2.01 
eStem Elementary School 0.88 
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Arkansas Virtual Academy distinguishes itself from other public charters in the Little 
Rock area because of the exceptional test score NPRs its students receive on all subjects.  The 
school has an overall NPR score of 67 while the mean NPR score of all middle schools in the 
Little Rock area is 41, lying at 1.70 standard deviations away from the mean. 
Figure 3: Overall NPR Score Distribution for Middle School 
 
ARVA not only has outlying test score NPRs, but demographics as well.  For the 2010-
2011 school year, 94% of the 67 students enrolled were White, where as only 6% of the student 
body identified as being a minority (3% Black and 3% Hispanic).  This figure is far from the 
mean overall minority statistic in the other charter and non-charters.  The mean percentage 
minority within middle schools in the area is 72% and the mean percentage White is 28%.  No 
students attending ARVA during the 2010-2011 were eligible for the Free Lunch Program, in 
direct contrast to other schools, whose mean percentage of student eligible for the Program was 
67%.  Similarly, the School Poverty Index at Arkansas Virtual Academy was 0% while other 
schools have a mean of 126%.  ARVA’s Index is 2.51 standard deviations from the mean.   
 Dreamland Academy of Performing and Communication Arts is another example of an 
outlying school.  Contrary to ARVA however, Dreamland Academy has exceptionally poor 
scores in all subject areas and has an overwhelmingly minority population.  The school serves K-
5 and enrolled 264 students for the 2010-2011 school year.  Below are individual statistics for 
Dreamland Academy: 
Table 8: Dreamland Academy Statistics 
Reading NPR 19 % FLP 98% 
Math NPR 20 School Poverty Index 188% 
Language NPR 17 % White 3% 
Science NPR 22 % Hispanic 8% 
Overall NPR 19 % Black 89% 
Overall NCE 31.5 % Overall Minority 97% 
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Dreamland Academy lags far behind both non-charter and charter elementary schools in 
all test subjects.  It has an overall NPR score 19 and is -2.01 standard deviations away from the 
mean test score of 47.   
Figure 4: Overall NPR Score Distribution for Elementary School  
 
 
Dreamland’s School Poverty Index and percentage of students who quality for the Free 
Lunch Program are overwhelmingly high, at 188% and 98% respectively.  Like ARVA, the 
school also has skewed demographics, but in the opposite direction.  97% of the school is 
minority students, which is 25% higher than the mean.       
 This initial analysis of the data now shows us that charter schools have skewed 
demographics and social-economic data as compared to their public school counterparts, 
pointing to selection bias.  Their mean test score NPRs also have a tendency to be higher.  Now 
the question is: Does charter attendance have a positive significant impact on both disadvantaged 
and well-performing students? 
V. Results 
 The most desired outcome is one in which the significant charter variables have a positive 
coefficient for all regressions, ceteris paribus.  Below are the results for each of the Regressions 
and broken up my elementary and middle school cohorts.  The values contain the coefficient as 
well as the t-statistic in parenthesis for each variable. 
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Table 9:  Regression Results for Reading Subtest 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
Variable Elem. Middle Elem. Middle Elem. Middle Elem. Middle Elem. Middle 
Charter -11.65 
(3.57) 
 
3.42 
(4.85) 
 
-12.29 
(3.2) 
 
1.36 
(13.5) 
 
-1.06 
(5.4) 
 
8.55 
(4.1) 
 
-17.29 
(6.0) 
 
5.19 
(4.4) 
 
-10.64 
(3.9) 
 
-6.55 
(7.2) 
 
% FLP 5.01 
(39.1) 
 
60.70 
(89.2) 
 
-3.95 
(36.5) 
 
6.97 
(78.8) 
 
- - -16.2 
(38.4) 
 
3.07 
(91.7) 
 
-2.31 
(36.7) 
 
37.50 
(89.2) 
 
% School 
Poverty 
Index 
-29.31 
(19.8) 
 
-50.90 
(44.0) 
 
-25.69 
(18.2) 
 
-33.55 
(40.1) 
 
- - -20.24 
(19.3) 
 
-31.00 
(45.8) 
 
-27.28 
(18.4) 
 
-57.77 
(45.5) 
 
% White 23.64 
(30.8) 
 
174.88 
(84.4) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
% Black 25.58 
(28.8) 
148.77 
(80.0) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
% Other 
Races 
40.51 
(39.0) 
 
213.65 
(95.0) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
% Overall 
Minority 
- - - - -44.17 
(4.7) 
 
-55.21 
(7.8) 
 
2.067 
(4.8) 
 
-9.39 
(17.0) 
 
2.83 
(4.8) 
 
7.27 
(13.7) 
 
% English 
Language 
Learner 
13.19 
(30.1) 
 
219.08 
(91.0) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
Intercept 62.52 
(30.3) 
 
-96.25 
(85.0) 
 
88.09 
(2.6) 
 
76.06 
(4.7) 
 
79.94 
(3.4) 
 
76.46 
(5.9) 
 
88.11 
(2.8) 
 
82.12 
(7.7) 
 
87.14 
(2.7) 
 
81.09 
(6.7) 
 
 
Table 10: Regression Results for Math Subtest 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
Variables Elem. Middle Elem. Middle Elem. Middle Elem. Middle Elem. Middle 
Charter -14.44 
(3.06) 
 
-0.32 
(7.6) 
 
-16.54 
(2.7) 
 
1.12 
(4.6) 
 
-5.92 
(4.6) 
 
6.17 
(4.8) 
 
-15.25 
(4.9) 
 
7.22 
(5.7) 
 
-16.09 
(3.3) 
 
-12.18 
(10.5) 
 
% FLP -16.35 
(33.5) 
 
172.09 
(139.0) 
 
-17.24 
(31.5) 
 
58.05 
(114) 
 
- - -41.69 
(31.6) 
 
4.26 
(120.0) 
 
-17.3 
(31.6) 
 
94.94 
(131.0) 
 
% School 
Poverty 
Index 
-13.56 
(17.0) 
 
-91.47 
(68.6) 
 
-18.36 
(15.7) 
 
-53.90 
(58.0) 
 
- - -3.851 
(15.9) 
 
-24.46 
(59.7) 
 
-16.21 
(15.9) 
 
-88.59 
(66.9) 
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% White 26.23 
(26.4) 
 
284.08 
(131.4) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
% Black 17.59 
(24.7) 
 
227.85 
(125.8) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
% Other 
Races 
47.52 
(33.4) 
 
253.08 
(148.0) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
% 
Overall 
Minority 
- - - - -45.60 
(4.0) 
 
-44.41 
(9.1) 
 
-6.512 
(3.9) 
 
-21.04 
(22.2) 
 
-5.158 
(4.1) 
 
16.42 
(20.2) 
 
% 
English 
Language 
Learner 
16.04 
(25.7) 
 
367.37 
(141.7) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
Intercept 59.60 
(26.8) 
 
202.61 
(134.4) 
 
87.58 
(2.2) 
 
71.14 
(6.9) 
 
80.79 
(2.9) 
 
 
73.04 
(6.9) 
 
89.85 
(2.3) 
85.27 
(10.1) 
 
88.16 
(2.3) 
 
78.84 
(9.8) 
 
 
Table 11: Regression Results for Language Subtest 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
Variable Elem. Middle Elem. Middle Elem. Middle Elem. Middle Elem. Middle 
Charter -20.4 
(3.74) 
 
-0.98 
(4.5) 
 
-19.9 
(3.3) 
 
-0.01 
(3.0) 
 
-8.29 
(5.5) 
 
5.70 
(4.2) 
 
-17.72 
(6.1) 
 
2.82 
(3.6) 
 
-21.5 
(4.1) 
 
-14.7 
(5.6) 
% FLP -54.9 
(40.9) 
 
18.38 
(82.5) 
 
-57.2 
(38.4) 
 
-7.71 
(75.0) 
 
- - -88.48 
(39.0) 
 
-62.15 
(73.7) 
 
-58.1 
(38.8) 
 
-25.3 
(70.8) 
 
% School 
Poverty 
Index 
-0.53 
(20.7) 
 
-32.64 
(40.7) 
 
0.56 
(19.2) 
 
-18.42 
(38.2) 
 
- - 14.425 
(19.0) 
 
-5.09 
(36.7) 
-0.93 
(19.5) 
 
-31.9 
(36.0) 
 
% White 3.77 
(32.3) 
 
118.45 
(78.3) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
% Black 8.12 
(30.1) 
 
117.51 
(74.6) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
% Other 
Races 
27.93 
(40.8) 
 
172.27 
(88.1) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
% Overall 
Minority 
- - - - -44.3 
(4.9) 
-36.90 
(8.2) 
2.4911 
(4.9) 
17.89 
(14.1) 
4.119 
(5.1) 
34.15 
(10.9) 
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% English 
Language 
Learner 
-9.16 
(31.4) 
 
178.02 
(85.4) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
Intercept 84.21 
(32.7) 
 
-51.78 
(78.7) 
 
90.24 
(2.7) 
 
66.88 
(4.5) 
 
79.48 
(3.5) 
 
63.60 
(6.1) 
 
92.248 
(2.8) 
 
74.83 
(6.2) 
 
90.15 
(2.9) 
 
72.49 
(5.3) 
 
 
Table 12: Regression Results for Science Subtest 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
Variable Elem. Middle Elem. Middle Elem. Middle Elem. Middle Elem. Middle 
Charter -9.77 
(3.99) 
 
-1.78 
(5.62) 
 
-7.07 
(3.9) 
 
1.13 
(3.5) 
 
1.33 
(5.5) 
 
8.18 
(5.0) 
 
-7.254 
(6.3) 
 
6.37 
(4.5) 
 
-5.09 
(4.9) 
 
-13.58 
(7.3) 
 
% FLP 8.37 
(39.8) 
 
21.22 
(105.0) 
 
30.76 
(40.5) 
 
30.83 
(87.8) 
 
- - 22.137 
(40.1) 
 
-20.85 
(93.4) 
 
30.76 
(39.3) 
 
9.7412 
(96.1) 
 
% School 
Poverty 
Index 
-30.21 
(20.2) 
 
-39.64 
(52.0) 
 
-44.5 
(20.2) 
 
-46.81 
(44.7) 
 
- - -34.38 
(20.1) 
 
-31.12 
(46.9) 
 
-38.7 
(19.7) 
 
-54.54 
(49.3) 
 
% White -54.26 
(30.9) 
 
97.36 
(96.8) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
% Black -61.80 
(28.9) 
 
84.27 
(92.3) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
% Other 
Races 
-58.51 
(39.3) 
 
137.15 
(109.0) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
% Overall 
Minority 
 - - - -51.9 
(4.3) 
 
-55.48 
(9.7) 
 
-13.83 
(5.1) 
 
5.93 
(17.5) 
 
-13.3 
(5.1) 
 
22.895 
(14.4) 
 
% English 
Language 
Learner 
-78.39 
(30.3) 
 
174.53 
(106.0) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
Intercept 139.72 
(31.4) 
 
-11.13 
(97.4) 
 
83.82 
(2.8) 
 
82.27 
(5.2) 
 
80.35 
(3.1) 
 
82.33 
(7.2) 
 
85.604 
(2.9) 
 
 
93.59 
(7.7) 
 
85.0 
(2.9) 
 
90.66 
(6.9) 
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Table 13: Regression Results for Overall NPRs 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
Variable Elem. Middle Elem. Middle Elem. Middle Elem. Middle Elem. Middle 
Charter -15.1 
(3.19) 
 
0.535 
(5.5) 
 
-15.7 
(2.8) 
 
1.24 
(3.7) 
 
-4.57 
(5.0) 
 
7.38 
(4.4) 
 
-16.19 
(5.2) 
 
6.045 
(4.9) 
 
-14.9 
(3.5) 
 
-10.6 
(8.5) 
 
% FLP -21.2 
(34.9) 
 
55.57 
(101.0) 
 
-24.3 
(32.0) 
 
29.52 
(92.2) 
 
- - -46.84 
(33.0) 
 
-7.31 
(102.0) 
 
-28.3 
(33.1) 
 
44.33 
(106.0) 
 
% School 
Poverty 
Index 
-14.9 
(17.7) 
 
-46.54 
(50.0) 
 
-15.5 
(16.0) 
-42.05 
(46.9) 
 
- - -4.124 
(17.0) 
 
-25.7 
(51.0) 
 
-12.6 
(16.6) 
 
-64 
(54.0) 
 
% White 16.33 
(27.5) 
 
166.62 
(95.8) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
% Black 15.04 
(25.7) 
 
141.25 
(91.7) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
% Other 
Races 
36.53 
(34.8) 
 
220.65 
(108.0) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
% Overall 
Minority 
- - - - -45.2 
(4.4) 
 
-48.59 
(8.4) 
 
-1.255 
(4.2) 
 
-8.25 
(18.9) 
 
-1.41 
(4.4) 
16.03 
(16.3) 
 
% English 
Language 
Learner 
4.85 
(26.8) 
 
238.73 
(103.0) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
Intercept 70.37 
(27.9) 
 
-90.37 
(96.4) 
 
88.59 
(2.3) 
 
72.91 
(5.6) 
 
80.18 
(3.2) 
 
73.29 
(6.4) 
 
90.068 
(2.4) 
 
 
83.14 
(8.6) 
 
88.27 
(2.4) 
 
79.72 
(7.9) 
 
 
The first regression takes all independent variables into account: the “Charter” dummy 
variable, “% FLP”, “School Poverty Index”, “% White”, “% Black”, “%Other Race”, and “% 
English Language Learner”.  When controlling for all variables besides the dummy variable, 
“Charter” is significant in elementary schools.  All test subject NPRs for elementary, however, 
have a negative coefficient, suggesting that the charter variable has a negative impact on test 
score NPRs.  None of the middle school charter coefficients for any subject are significant.  
However the race variables are significant and positive in the middle school model and 
particularly in Reading, Math, and Overall NPR.  This suggests that race is positively correlated 
to test scores in middle.  This is explored further in the following paragraphs.   
 The second regression analyzes what affect the poverty variables, “%FLP” and “School 
Poverty Index”, have on test score NPRs.  As with Regression 1, the Regression 2 elementary 
school charter variable is significant but negative, meaning that attending a charter negatively 
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impacts test scores when controlling for poverty measures.  The Regression 2 middle school 
charter variable is positively correlated to test scores in all subjects, but none are significant at a 
0.05 alpha level.          
 The third regression uses only the “Charter” dummy and “% Overall Minority” as 
independent variables.  Controlling for “% Overall Minority”, the Charter variables are 
insignificant for both elementary and middle.  However, with the exception of Science test score 
NPRs elementary charter variables have negative coefficients and middle charter variables have 
positive coefficients.  That is to say that charter attendance has a positive impact on test scores 
when being a minority is taken into account.  This is consistent with finds in Regression 1 middle 
school which suggest that race and test scores are positively correlated.    
 Regressions 4 and 5 use “Charter”, “% FLP”, “School Poverty Index”, and “% Overall 
Minority” as independent variables.  Regression 4 elementary and middle use charter data only 
from the poorer performing charters: Dreamland Elementary School, Cloverdale Aerospace 
Middle School, Covenant Keepers Middle School, and Ridgeroad Middle School.  Regression 5 
uses charter data only from the better performing charters: Arkansas Virtual Academy 
elementary and middle Schools, eStem Elementary and Middle Schools, and Lisa Academy 
elementary and middle Schools.  Given that Regression 4 takes data from the poorer performing 
schools, we would expect the Charter independent variable to have a large significant impact on 
test scores, relative to the better performing schools.  Similarly, we would expect the charter 
variable to positively impact test scores in the better performing schools, but to a lesser degree.  
All Regression 4 and 5 elementary charter variables are significant, expect for Science.  The 
coefficients are negative however, meaning that for elementary schools, charter attendance has a 
bad impact on test scores regardless of whether the school performs well or not.  All but one of 
the middle school charter variables is significant.  It is important to note that the charter 
coefficients for poorer performing Middle schools are positive and have an impact on test score 
NPRs.  Conversely, the middle school charter variable has a negative impact on test scores in 
better performing schools.          
 All of the regressions as a whole point to the fact that charter attendance negatively 
impacts all test score performance in elementary schools.  Middle school charters have a positive 
impact on test score NPRs when using poverty and minority variables, as demonstrated by 
Regressions 2 and 3.  Regressions 4 and 5 show that charters have a greater impact on test scores 
in poorer performing schools and a negative impact on schools that perform better. 
VI. Policy Implications 
 The results from this study have vastly different policy implication for elementary and 
middle school students.  Given that charters have a negative impact on test score NPRs for 
elementary students, these charters must be either improved upon or shut down, depending on 
the specific school.  As discussed in the Literature Review section, some researchers believe that 
charters experience an initially drop in test scores and then bounce back after a few years.  
Although this may be the case for some elementary schools, other may need to revise their 
curriculum on implement drastic changes to improve result.       
 The outcome from the previous section tells a vastly different story for middle school 
charter students.  Regressions show that charter attendance has a positive impact on test scores of 
this cohort in poor performing schools and a negative impact in good performing schools.  
Charter policy should therefore be aimed at “low-achieving” or “at-risk” students and not toward 
students that are “high-achieving”.  As demonstrated earlier in the “Data and Methodology 
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section”, the poorer performing charters have a disproportionally high poverty and minority 
levels.  Charter resources should be channeled to meet their needs and that provide this group 
with more equal and better educational opportunities, just as Milton Friedman had intended.   
VII. Avenues for Further Research 
 As is always the case with research, there are numerous areas to improve this study to 
generate more accurate results.  The data set used in the paper only contains variables for the 
2010-2011 academic year.  To further assess the impact of charters on test scores, future research 
should use longitudinal data over as long of a period of time as possible.  The use of long-term 
data will help researchers better determine the long-term effects of charter schools.  As stated in 
the Literature Review section, some studies conclude that charter’s test scores initially drop 
when the school is opened, but then improve over time as the school “learns”.  Analyses about 
charters over time may have an impact on policy decisions.  The findings may have an effect on 
curriculum, student admissions, location, resources available, etc.      
 Other researches on this topic may also consider including other independent variables 
that impact test scores such as student background, building characteristics including its location 
within the city, and whether the charter is a start-up or a conversion.  Witte and Weimer’s (2007) 
analysis of Wisconsin charter schools takes student-teacher ratios and percent of disabled 
students, and an indicator if the schools itself is “at-risk”.  The use of these variables will create a 
more accurate model and results.          
 The model would be greatly improved if the sample size of charters in Little Rock was 
greater.  The number of charters has not increased rapidly, but increasing the size of the area the 
samples are taken from was expanded, more charter data could be available.  Another option is to 
take charter school data from other large and similar cities within Arkansas.  If the study were to 
control for location, there will be more charter data.  More data will also mitigate variances. 
 Lastly, this study only takes into account the direct impact charter attendance has on test 
scores.  More in-depth studies have the potential to analyze the externalities cause by charter 
policy.  This can include impact on public school test scores, student teacher-ratio, resources and 
budgets as well as charter student behavior and attendance.  Charter may also have an indirect 
impact on the economy of the area around the school, both immediately and over the decades. 
VIII. Conclusion 
 Charter schools, as a form of school choice, are a gateway to better educational quality 
and equality.  An analysis of the data shows that charters have a wider variance of poverty and 
minority demographics than their public school counterparts, pointing to selection bias.  This 
study of charter and public schools in the Little Rock area concluded that charter attendance 
negatively impacts elementary test scores and middle school scores in charter that serve higher-
achieving students. However, charter attendance has a positive impact on middle schools with 
disadvantaged students.  This implies that charter policy should be shaped towards serving “at-
risk” students in more racially diverse communities.  It is worth noting that although charter 
schools as a form of school choice does not positively impact all students, it impacts those who 
might not have an equal opportunity for a better education.  The results demonstrate that charters 
are an endeavor worth pursuing for those in need. 
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